Do rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so, what does such recognition consist in, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons?
We invite submissions of abstracts for a workshop on these and related questions.
Key Information
- Date & Location: October 29–30, 2026, Heidelberg University
- Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford), Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)
- Funding: travel expenses up to €600 and accommodation in Heidelberg will be covered
- Contributed slots: up to six
- Abstract length: ca. 1000 words
- Submission email: rational_action_belief@protonmail.com
- Submission deadline: July 12, 2026
- Notification: by the end of July
Workshop Themes
Does forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor’s belief that the patient has measles to be rational, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.
On this view, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a taking condition, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be treated as normative reasons. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons.
We invite contributions that explore the role of recognising, taking, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action, including critical perspectives.
Topics include (but are not limited to):
- Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?
- What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state, for example, that the evidence supports p, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?
- If the recognition condition is non-doxastic, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill, is it a form of rule following, or something else entirely?
- If the recognition condition is doxastic, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?
- Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?
- Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses?
- What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons, such as “therefore” and “because”?
Please send your submission, prepared for blind review, together with a separate title page containing the author’s details (name, title, affiliation, and email address) to rational_action_belief@protonmail.com. Please direct all queries to the organisers Andreas Müller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com). Queries sent to the submission email may be overlooked.