Art der Ankündigung: Call for Paper (Sammelband)

Affective Lives Beyond Compulsory Sexuality, Romance, and Monogamy: Emotional Experience in Asexuality, Aromanticism, and Polyamory

Guest editors: Kristin Käuper (University of Leeds) and Sven Walter (Osnabrück University)

Philosophers of emotion have devoted considerable attention to love, desire, jealousy, attachment, intimacy, and other affective dimensions of close relationships. Yet, philosophical reflection on these phenomena often rests on unexamined assumptions about sexuality, romance, and monogamy: for instance, that sexual desire is a central feature of human affective life, that romantic love constitutes a distinctive and especially significant form of intimacy, or that exclusive romantic partnerships are the paradigmatic form of intimate relationships.

This special issue asks what happens to familiar concepts in the philosophy of emotion once we look beyond these assumptions about sexuality, romance, and monogamy and no longer take them as common reference points. Asexual, aromantic, polyamorous, and related experiences do not merely add previously neglected cases to existing philosophical theories. They may require us to reconsider not only prevailing norms, but the concepts themselves.

Asexual experience, for example, raises questions about the nature and relations between sexual attraction, sexual desire, arousal, pleasure, romantic attraction, and love. Aromantic experience invites renewed examination of what, if anything, distinguishes romantic from non-romantic forms of love, and of the value we assign to different forms of attachment, care, and intimacy. Polyamorous experience raises questions about feelings of jealousy and compersion, trust, commitment, attachment, emotional exclusivity, and the norms through which these emotions are judged as fitting. More broadly, these experiences invite reflection on how social norms shape not only which emotions are judged appropriate, but also how people understand and distinguish forms of attraction, attachment, intimacy, and care in the first place.

Expressions of Interest

We invite expressions of interest prior to full manuscript submissions to this Special Issue. To register your interest, please send a short proposal (max. 300 words) to the guest editors until 1 January 2027. If your contribution is from outside of philosophy, please note this in your submission and briefly explain how your proposal is relevant to a philosophical discussion of these topics. You will then be invited to submit your manuscript for this issue or discuss the fit of your proposal with the editors.

Expression of interest: 1 January 2027

Submission deadline: 30 September 2027

Guest editors: Kristin Käuper (kshl0382@leeds.ac.uk) and Sven Walter (svwalter@uos.de)

We are welcoming submissions to a Special Issue of Philosophical Studies on Partial Aggregation.

Many believe that we ought to save countless people from full-body paralysis rather than save a single life, but that it would be wrong to prevent countless headaches rather than save a single person’s life. Those judgments are in tension. The first favours an aggregative moral ideal, according to which burdens can be added up in moral reasoning, so that they together outweigh a more severe burden. The second favours an anti-aggregative moral ideal, on which sufficiently large burdens retain priority over any number of smaller burdens. Theories of partial (or limited) aggregation aspire to reconcile these judgements in a principled way. Their broader interest lies in the prospect of settling long-standing debates in ethical theory, for example, between contractualists and consequentialists, regarding when and why the numbers should count.

The proliferation of recent work on these topics suggests a number of pressing open questions. What justifies partial aggregation? How should key notions like a claim to be saved, moral relevance, or individualist moral theory be understood? What decision procedure should we use when adjudicating between competing claims or interests? We welcome submissions which address the foundations, concepts and mechanisms at play in partial aggregation.

Possible Topics include (but are not limited to):

• Is partial aggregation consistent or does it collapse into either full aggregation or scepticism about aggregation?
• Should partial aggregation be understood in terms of moral relevance, lexicality, axiological principles of priority or equality, bounded aggregation, or in some other way?
• Can partial aggregation be reconciled with individualist moral theory? What makes a moral theory “individualist” in the relevant sense? What is the best formulation of the so-called “individualist restriction”? What distinctive advantages and challenges come with a contractualist approach to partial aggregation, or with a consequentialist one?
• What are moral claims, and how do they relate to interests and reasons? What does it take for claims to be relevant to each other or to one’s decision? How should claims be balanced, added up, cancelled, or otherwise combined?
• How should partial aggregation handle cases involving heterogeneous groups, multiple options, non-fixed populations, quasi-competition, risk, and diachronic choices? How should we assess the extensional adequacy and explanatory power of a theory of partial aggregation?
• Do moral and political philosophy call for distinct theories of partial aggregation, or will a unified account suffice? How does partial aggregation bear (for example) on public policy, on the distribution of scarce medical resources, and on the constraints we impose on AI agents?

Papers should be submitted via the journal’s online submission system before 31st July 2027 (please indicate that your submission is for consideration in relation to Partial Aggregation).

For more information, see the special issue page here: https://link.springer.com/collections/aigddfdadc

If you have any questions, contact Milan Mossé (milan_mosse@stanford.edu).

Lea Bourguignon (Cambridge), Jonas Harney (Fribourg), and Milan Mossé (Stanford), special issue editors.

Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie (ZEMO)

Call for papers: Philosophy of Propaganda

Guest Editor: Dr. Christiane Turza (Regensburg, Germany)

Deadline: October 1, 2026 – Extended Deadline: November 15, 2026

The concept of propaganda is surrounded by an aura of negativity. It is often associated with the appropriation and distortion of reality. Those who engage in propaganda are said to advocate for a particular idea, but in an improper or misleading way. The term propaganda is also used when the ideas being disseminated appear suspect; it is assumed that “genuine” political education or enlightenment would have to convey different kinds of content. Thus, the concept of propaganda seems to function primarily as a tool for identifying problematic forms of communication.

However, what exactly—if anything at all—is (prima facie) so problematic about propaganda? What kind of error does a person (or a state) commit when engaging in propaganda? Is it an epistemic error, or a moral one? And is it even true that propaganda is (prima facie) inherently problematic? This latter question is particularly salient because the term is also employed in positive or value‑neutral ways describing communicative contributions. Without a clear account of the negative implications commonly attributed to the term, there is a risk that the word propaganda will be misused as a mere label of rejection.

The special issue, to be published in 2027, aims to clarify what propaganda is and how the concept might be understood in order to make it fruitful for debates concerning epistemically and morally appropriate communication. Relevant questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Should propaganda be understood as a value-laden concept, or rather as a neutral one?
• If propaganda denotes a faulty kind of behavior, what kind(s) of error does it involve?
• Should propaganda be understood as something
• … necessarily connected to a clear intention, such as disinformation or a clear lack of concern for truth?
• … that people can spread not only intentionally but also unintentionally—for instance, when they disseminate false information without realizing or intending it? If so, does this imply that engaging in propaganda may be difficult to avoid entirely?
• … that cannot, by its very nature, constitute a rational contribution to public discourse?
• … that necessarily (and deliberately) undermines democratic ideals or reinforces non-democratic ones? Or could there also be propaganda in support of democracy and human rights?
• … that only authoritarian or totalitarian states employ?
• Should propaganda be understood as a purely instrumental-rational (manipulative) form of communication?
• Are there meaningful differences between (political) advertising, public relations, and propaganda—and if so, what are they?
• Should propaganda and enlightenment or education be conceptually distinguished—and if so, how?

Submissions—either in English or German, and with a maximum length of 9,000 words—may be uploaded via the journal’s Editorial Manager system:

https://www.editorialmanager.com/zemo/default.aspx

Mit dem PhilFocus entsteht ein neues Format des FID Philosophie, das aktuelle philosophische Debatten über verschiedene philosophische Disziplingrenzen hinaus sichtbar macht und bündelt. Ausgangspunkt des neuen Formats ist die Leerstelle, die sich mit der Einstellung der Zeitschrift Information Philosophie als zentraler Ort für Diskussionen und Informationen ergeben hat. Das Projekt PhilFocus möchte entsprechend bestehende philosophische Blogs durch thematisch fokussierte und disziplinübergreifende Beiträge ergänzen.

Geplant ist, dass zwei Mal im Jahr eine Ausgabe herausgegeben wird, die jeweils ein Thema in zwei Formaten bespricht: Zum einen durch ein Essay, das eine klar konturierte Position zum Thema entwickelt. Zum anderen ein Dialogformat, das entweder als klassisches Interview oder als Gespräch mehrerer Beteiligter ausgeführt werden kann. Die Idee des Dialogformats ist es, unterschiedliche philosophische Hintergründe und Perspektiven abzubilden; es ist wünschenswert, dass die beteiligten Personen aus unterschiedlichen philosophischen Kontexten stammen. Das Gespräch kann entweder transkribiert oder in Form der Beantwortung von Leitfragen gestaltet werden.

Der FID Philosophie stellt hierfür die technische Infrastruktur bereit, indem die Beiträge in verschiedenen Formaten (HTML, PDF, XML) und mit einer DOI publiziert werden, und über das philportal dauerhaft zugänglich gemacht werden. Damit entsteht ein verlässlicher und zitierfähiger Publikationsrahmen.

Inhaltlich ist das Projekt jedoch auf die Mitwirkung aus der Fachcommunity angewiesen, weshalb wir zwei Mal im Jahr dazu einladen, sowohl einen Themenvorschlag einzureichen als auch mögliche Philosoph:innen für das Essay und Gespräch vorzuschlagen. Hinzuweisen ist hier darauf, dass die Essays und das Gespräch bzw. Interview eigenständig editorisch zu erarbeiten sind und der FID lediglich eine unterstützende Rolle einnimmt. PhilFocus soll folglich ein Format sein, das thematische Impulse aus der Community aufgreift und sichtbar macht.

Für die erste Ausgabe schlagen wir zur Einfachheit das Thema „Wie politisch ist die Philosophie und wie politisch kann oder soll sie sein?“ vor, sodass der Call sich spezifisch auf Vorschläge für das Essay und Interview bezieht. Das Thema zielt darauf, unterschiedliche philosophische Perspektiven miteinander ins Gespräch zu bringen und Spannungen, Überschneidungen und Differenzen produktiv sichtbar zu machen.

Wenn Sie an der Mitgestaltung der ersten Ausgabe interessiert sind, senden Sie uns bitte zunächst eine kurze Interessensbekundung zu. Sie können entweder einen Vorschlag für das Essay und den Dialog einreichen oder nur für eines der beiden Formate. Bitte nennen Sie jeweils die beteiligten Personen sowie eine kurze Skizze des Vorhabens (max. 1 Seite).

Die Interessensbekundungen können an folgende Adresse geschickt werden: vanessaossino@gmail.com

• Die Frist der Einreichung von Interessensbekundungen ist der 31.08.2026
• Die Auswahl der Beiträge erfolgt bis Mitte September 2026
• Das Essay sowie die Mitschrift des Interviews bzw. Dialogs werden bis Ende Januar erwartet
• Die Veröffentlichung der ersten Ausgabe ist für das Frühjahr 2027 erwartet

ZEMO Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie / Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Call for papers 

Cancel Culture: What’s Supposed to Be So Bad About It?

_______________________________________________________________

The term ‘cancel culture’ has been used critically to describe a wide range of things: practices such as deplatforming, social exclusion, boycotts, or even public criticism. What is contested is not only which specific practices should count as instances of canceling. It also remains unclear what precisely constitutes a culture of canceling, and at what point it is appropriate to speak of one at all. 

The Topical Collection – to be published in 2027 – has two objectives: 

First, it seeks to examine which phenomena might actually merit the label “canceling” or even “cancel culture”, and why. 

Second, it aims to clarify what, if anything, is morally problematic about them. 

Contributions that take into account the challenges of the digital public sphere are particularly welcome, as are those that reflect on the political use of the labels “cancel culture” and “canceling” and address their potential role as political battle concepts. 

By focusing on communicative phenomena and cultural practices that are highly contested in both academia and public discourse, the collection aims to contribute to research in communication ethics and, more specifically, to normative inquiry into the dynamics of discursive and social polarization.

Contributions – either in English or German, and with a maximum length of 9,000 words – may be submitted in anonymized form via the journal’s Editorial Manager: https://www.editorialmanager.com/zemo/default.aspx

All submissions undergo a double-blind peer review. Accepted contributions will be published immediately on the ZEMO website as part of the Continuous Article Publishing model.

__________________________________________________________________

Deadline

31/01/2027

____________________________________________________________________

Guest Editors

Silvia Donzelli, Institute of Philosophy, University of Regensburg (Germany): silvia.donzelli@ur.de

Dr. Christiane Turza, Institute of Philosophy, University of Regensburg (Germany): christiane.turza@ur.de 

______________________________________________________________

See also: Cancel Culture: What’s Supposed to Be So Bad About It? | Springer Nature Link

Call for Blogbeiträge: Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte

Der Philosophie-Blog praefaktisch lädt ein, Texte und Textideen zum neuen Schwerpunkt Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte einzureichen.

Beiträge, Beitragsideen und Fragen zum Themenschwerpunkt können gerne an Karen Koch [Karen.Koch@unibas.ch] und Jonas Ouass [Jonas.Ouass@hhu.de] gesendet werden.

Informationen zum Format von Blogbeiträgen finden sich im praefaktisch-Leitfaden: https://praefaktisch.de/leitfaden/

Der Schwerpunkt Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte

Ein Blick in historische Einführungen in die Philosophie genügt: Darstellungen der Philosophiegeschichte sind vorwiegend weiß und männlich geprägt.

Dabei ist es nicht so, als hätte es philosophierende Frauen bis vor dem letzten Jahrhundert nicht gegeben. Im Gegenteil, es gab einen regen Austausch in verschiedenen zum Beispiel literarischen Formen (etwa der Briefwechsel zwischen Elisabeth von der Pfalz und René Descartes). Frauen sind jedoch nach wie vor in der Philosophiegeschichte zu wenig sichtbar.

Aktuelle Projekte wie das Verbundprojekt Bildersturm (Universität Göttingen), die Arbeitsgemeinschaft „Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte“ (DGPHIL) oder der Verein „Society for Women in Philosophy“ (SW*IP) haben es sich unter anderem zum Ziel gesetzt, männlich dominierte Darstellungen der Philosophiegeschichte aufzubrechen und Frauen sichtbarer zu machen.

Wir laden zu Blogbeiträgen ein, die sich gezielt mit den philosophischen Theorien von Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte auseinandersetzen, das Thema „Frauen in der Philosophiegeschichte“ auf einer Metaebene behandeln oder Projekte vorstellen wollen, die solche Themen angehen.

Beiträge und Beitragsideen zu diesen und verwandten Themen können gerne an Karen Koch [Karen.Koch@unibas.ch] und Jonas Ouass [Jonas.Ouass@hhu.de] gesendet werden.

Der Schutz der Privatsphäre wird durch den zunehmenden Einsatz digitaler Technologien und ihre Weiterentwicklung vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Big-Tech-Unternehmen wie Alphabet, Amazon oder Meta verfolgen Geschäftsmodelle, die wesentlich auf der Erfassung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten beruhen. Diese Daten werden genutzt, um Informationen über (potenzielle) Kund:innen zu erhalten und ihr Verhalten beeinflussen zu können. Darüber hinaus verwenden staatliche Behörden hochentwickelte Technologien der Datenintegration und -analyse von Firmen wie Palantir oder Clearview AI, um ihre Sicherheitsinteressen durchzusetzen und weitreichende Formen der digitalen Überwachung zu etablieren.

Dabei wird die Privatsphäre zwar von vielen für wichtig und schützenswert gehalten, während aber zugleich keine Einigkeit darüber besteht, wie verschiedene Konzeptionen der Privatheit und ihres Werts zu beurteilen sind, und nicht ausreichend reflektiert wird, inwiefern die Privatsphäre angesichts neuer Technologien der Datenverarbeitung und digitalen Überwachung besser geschützt werden sollte. Entsprechend ist beispielsweise nicht klar, ob das Prinzip der informierten Einwilligung dazu geeignet ist, im Umgang mit datenverarbeitenden Unternehmen einen zufriedenstellenden Privatsphärenschutz zu gewährleisten. Dies lässt sich unter anderem daran festmachen, dass verschiedene Personengruppen aufgrund besonderer Vulnerabilitäten und ungleicher Kompetenzen unterschiedlich gut dazu in der Lage sind, sich vor Verletzungen ihrer Privatsphäre zu schützen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund lädt die Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie dazu ein, philosophische Beiträge einzureichen, die sich etwa mit folgenden Fragen auseinandersetzen:

• Welche Privatheitskonzeptionen oder Auffassungen zum Wert von Privatheit erweisen sich angesichts neuer digitaler Technologien und deren vielfältigem Einsatz als plausibel?
• Wie ist das sogenannte „Privacy Paradox“ zu beurteilen, dem zufolge Personen häufig behaupten, dass ihnen Privatsphäre wichtig sei, während diese bei Entscheidungen zur Weitergabe persönlicher Daten keine große Rolle zu spielen scheint?
• Wo liegen die Grenzen der informierten Einwilligung als Grundlage für die Zulässigkeit der digitalen Erfassung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten?
• Soll der Privatsphärenschutz diversitätsgerecht gestaltet werden, so dass die besonderen Bedürfnisse vulnerabler Gruppen ernst genommen werden können?
• Inwiefern ist die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten mit Problemen verbunden, die sich nur angehen lassen, wenn über das individuelle Recht auf Privatsphäre hinausgedacht und etwa algorithmische Diskriminierung oder Gruppenrechte einbezogen werden?

Die Einreichungsfrist für die Beiträge ist der 31. August 2026. Alle eingereichten Beiträge durchlaufen den üblichen doppelt-blinden Begutachtungsprozess. Die Einreichung erfolgt über die Webseite der ZfPP, wo Sie auch Informationen zu Umfang und Gestaltung des Manuskripts finden: https://www.praktische-philosophie.org.

Bei Rückfragen kontaktieren Sie Lukas Naegeli (lukas.naegeli@uni-passau.de).

Call for Papers: Special Issue at the Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics on Connexive Logic

Guest Editors:

Sara Ayhan (Tohoku University) & Hitoshi Omori (Tohoku University)

Submission Deadline: September 30, 2026

Content:

Modern connexive logic started in the 1960s with seminal papers by Richard B. Angell and Storrs McCall. Connexive logics are orthogonal to classical logic insofar as they validate certain non-theorems of classical logic, namely (in Polish notation)

• Aristotle’s Theses: NCNpp, NCpNp
• Boethius‘ Theses: CCpqNCpNq, CCpNqNCpq

Systems of connexive logic have been motivated by considerations on a content connection between the antecedent and succedent of valid implications and by applications that range from Aristotle’s syllogistic to Categorial Grammar and the study of causal implications. Surveys of connexive logic can be found in:

• S. McCall, „A History of Connexivity“, in D.M. Gabbay et al. (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 11. Logic: A History of its Central Concepts, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2012, pp. 415-449.
• H. Wansing, „Connexive logic„, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

This special issue is based on the 10th Workshop on Connexive Logics that was held in November 2025 at Tohoku University in Sendai, Japan. However, submissions are not limited to participants of the workshop, but any papers related to connexive logics are welcome!

Topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following:

• Philosophical considerations of the notion of connexivity;
• Arguments for or against connexive logics;
• Examinations of systems of connexive logics;
• Non-explosiveness of logical consequence;
• Empirical studies on the scope of connexivity.

When submitting, please make sure to indicate that this is a submission to the special issue on connexive logic.

Submissions will be subject to the usual review process of the Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics and are to be made via the submission site to be found here: https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/tncl20

For any questions please contact us at sara.ayhan.c7@tohoku.ac.jp or hitoshiomori@gmail.com

Call for Papers: Philosophy of Propaganda 

Special Issue in ZEMO, Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Guest Editor: Christiane Turza

Deadline: October 1, 2026

Description:

The concept of propaganda is surrounded by an aura of negativity. It is often associated with the appropriation and distortion of reality. Those who engage in propaganda are said to advocate for a particular idea, but in an improper or misleading way. The term propaganda is also used when the ideas being disseminated appear suspect; it is assumed that “genuine” political education or enlightenment would have to convey different kinds of content. Thus, the concept of propaganda seems to function primarily as a tool for identifying problematic forms of communication.

However, what exactly—if anything at all—is (prima facie) so problematic about propaganda? What kind of error does a person (or a state) commit when engaging in propaganda? Is it an epistemic error, or a moral one? And is it even true that propaganda is (prima facie) inherently problematic? This latter question is particularly salient because the term is also employed in positive or value‑neutral ways describing communicative contributions. Without a clear account of the negative implications commonly attributed to the term, there is a risk that the word propaganda will be misused as a mere label of rejection.

The special issue, to be published in 2027, aims to clarify what propaganda is and how the concept might be understood in order to make it fruitful for debates concerning epistemically and morally appropriate communication. Relevant questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Should propaganda be understood as a value-laden concept, or rather as a neutral one?
• If propaganda denotes a faulty kind of behavior, what kind(s) of error does it involve?
• Should propaganda be understood as something
• … necessarily connected to a clear intention, such as disinformation or a clear lack of concern for truth?
• … that people can spread not only intentionally but also unintentionally—for instance, when they disseminate false information without realizing or intending it? If so, does this imply that engaging in propaganda may be difficult to avoid entirely?
• … that cannot, by its very nature, constitute a rational contribution to public discourse?
• … that necessarily (and deliberately) undermines democratic ideals or reinforces non-democratic ones? Or could there also be propaganda in support of democracy and human rights?
• … that only authoritarian or totalitarian states employ?
• Should propaganda be understood as a purely instrumental-rational (manipulative) form of communication?
• Are there meaningful differences between (political) advertising, public relations, and propaganda—and if so, what are they?
• Should propaganda and enlightenment or education be conceptually distinguished—and if so, how?

Submissions—either in English or German and with a maximum length of 9,000 words—may be uploaded via the journal’s Editorial Manager system:

https://www.editorialmanager.com/zemo/default.aspx

Special Issue “Scientific understanding and Machine Learning in science: From traditional themes to recent developments and new vistas”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

We invite submissions for the virtual special issue (VSI) “Scientific understanding and Machine Learning in science: From traditional themes to recent developments and new vistas”, to be published with Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

Machine Learning (ML) systems are increasingly central to scientific inquiry, from climate modeling and drug discovery to astro- and particle physics. These developments raise fundamental questions about the nature, role, and value of understanding in science:

• Does scientific understanding require interpretable models, or can it also be achieved through opaque models?
• What is the role of methods from ‘explainable Artificial Intelligence’? How do these connect to traditional notions of understanding and explanation?
• How do ML methods shift epistemic priorities between explanation and prediction?
• Can advances brought about by ML models in science shed new light on the relation between understanding and explanation?
• Are new forms of understanding with or without explanation emerging in data-intensive, ML-driven science?
• How does understanding with ML models trade on traditional notions related to understanding, such as grasping, skill, or the subject, object and medium of understanding?
• Historically, how did ML in science evolve from being mostly a classification device into a rich source of novel representations, knowledge and, potentially, understanding? 
• In this capacity, how does today’s Neural Network-driven ML compare to historically dominant forms of AI, including symbolic ones?

The VSI seeks to critically examine how ML is reshaping the epistemic landscape in science, with a particular focus on the concept of scientific understanding. It aims to provide a forum for philosophers of science and ML, as well as philosophically inclined ML practitioners, to assess whether and how ML methods are altering the conceptual and methodological foundations of scientific inquiry. By bringing these debates together in one collection, the VSI will clarify ongoing debates, identify emerging philosophical topics and frameworks, and situate ML within longer historical trajectories of scientific reasoning and inquiry.

The VSI will be open towards interdisciplinary contributions, covering both philosophical analysis and empirical case studies across a range of scientific domains where ML is currently playing a transformative role, including the physical, life and social sciences.

Manuscript submission information:

Manuscripts (up to 12,000 words) may be submitted until 20 May 2026. For any inquiries about the appropriateness of contribution topics, please contact Dr. Annika Schuster via annika.schuster@tu-dortmund.de. For detailed information please visit https://www.sciencedirect.com/special-issue/328936/scientific-understanding-and-machine-learning-in-science-from-traditional-themes-to-recent-developments-and-new-vistas.