Art der Ankündigung: Call for Paper (Sammelband)

With the rapid progress in generative AI technology, we find ourselves at the beginning of an AI revolution. AI systems typified by Large Language Models (LLMs) invite us to treat them as conversational and thought partners. These systems will play an increasingly significant role in our social world. To understand their impact, this Topical Collection proposes to combine foundational work from philosophy on the nature of joint skilled action, including the role of social affordances, with the analysis of interactive AI systems that may have the potential to qualify as partners in social agency.

Many skills essential for us as social agents can only be expressed with others or involve others as social objects. The concept of an affordance, which picks out action opportunities in an agent’s environment, can be extended to opportunities for social action, that is, to social affordances that include other social agents presenting social action opportunities.

Given the conversational interface between humans and artificial systems such as LLMs, we can expect to perceive or rely on social affordances in human-machine interactions: AI systems such as LLMs and social robots are designed to provide social cues and thereby offer opportunities for the expression of social action. AI systems now occupy various social roles—as collaborators, companions, friends, counselors, and even therapists—raising a host of theoretical, practical, and ethical questions about their capacity to produce and interpret social cues.

Appropriate topics for submission include, among others:

• What are the commonalities and differences between human-human, human-machine, and machine-machine interactions?
• What is missing in interactions in which machines are involved in comparison with human social interactions? What are the practical and ethical implications? Can (and if so, should) artificial systems be trained to be skilled “partners” in joint activities with human partners?
• Can artificial systems based on generative AI technology (like LLMs) qualify as genuine agents and, in particular, social agents? How might social ontological accounts of group agency be brought to bear on candidate generative AI agents?
• To what extent do they genuinely present social affordances? To what extent do they have social skills?
• How should we conceptualize the abilities of artificial systems that may play roles in joint intentional activities?
• Does it make a difference whether a human agent conceptualizes the AI system as a tool, as opposed to a partner, in a joint activity?

Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx

Editors: Joshua Rust (Stetson University, US), Anna Strasser (DenkWerkstatt Berlin), Amber Ross (University of Florida, US)

Call for Papers: Privatsphäre in digitalen Umgebungen

Der Schutz der Privatsphäre wird durch den zunehmenden Einsatz digitaler Technologien und ihre Weiterentwicklung vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Big-Tech-Unternehmen wie Alphabet, Amazon oder Meta verfolgen Geschäftsmodelle, die wesentlich auf der Erfassung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten beruhen. Diese Daten werden genutzt, um Informationen über (potenzielle) Kund:innen zu erhalten und ihr Verhalten beeinflussen zu können. Darüber hinaus verwenden staatliche Behörden hochentwickelte Technologien der Datenintegration und -analyse von Firmen wie Palantir oder Clearview AI, um ihre Sicherheitsinteressen durchzusetzen und weitreichende Formen der digitalen Überwachung zu etablieren.

Dabei wird die Privatsphäre zwar von vielen für wichtig und schützenswert gehalten, während aber zugleich keine Einigkeit darüber besteht, wie verschiedene Konzeptionen der Privatheit und ihres Werts zu beurteilen sind, und nicht ausreichend reflektiert wird, inwiefern die Privatsphäre angesichts neuer Technologien der Datenverarbeitung und digitalen Überwachung besser geschützt werden sollte. Entsprechend ist beispielsweise nicht klar, ob das Prinzip der informierten Einwilligung dazu geeignet ist, im Umgang mit datenverarbeitenden Unternehmen einen zufriedenstellenden Privatsphärenschutz zu gewährleisten. Dies lässt sich unter anderem daran festmachen, dass verschiedene Personengruppen aufgrund besonderer Vulnerabilitäten und ungleicher Kompetenzen unterschiedlich gut dazu in der Lage sind, sich vor Verletzungen ihrer Privatsphäre zu schützen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund lädt die Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie dazu ein, philosophische Beiträge einzureichen, die sich etwa mit folgenden Fragen auseinandersetzen:

• Welche Privatheitskonzeptionen oder Auffassungen zum Wert von Privatheit erweisen sich angesichts neuer digitaler Technologien und deren vielfältigem Einsatz als plausibel?
• Wie ist das sogenannte „Privacy Paradox“ zu beurteilen, dem zufolge Personen häufig behaupten, dass ihnen Privatsphäre wichtig sei, während diese bei Entscheidungen zur Weitergabe persönlicher Daten keine große Rolle zu spielen scheint?
• Wo liegen die Grenzen der informierten Einwilligung als Grundlage für die Zulässigkeit der digitalen Erfassung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten?
• Soll der Privatsphärenschutz diversitätsgerecht gestaltet werden, so dass die besonderen Bedürfnisse vulnerabler Gruppen ernst genommen werden können?
• Inwiefern ist die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten mit Problemen verbunden, die sich nur angehen lassen, wenn über das individuelle Recht auf Privatsphäre hinausgedacht und etwa algorithmische Diskriminierung oder Gruppenrechte einbezogen werden?

Die Einreichungsfrist für die Beiträge ist der 15.04.2026. Die Veröffentlichung des Schwerpunkts ist für Winter 2026 geplant. Alle eingereichten Beiträge durchlaufen den üblichen doppelt-blinden Begutachtungsprozess. Die Einreichung erfolgt über die Webseite der ZfPP, wo Sie auch Informationen zu Umfang und Gestaltung des Manuskripts finden: https://www.praktische-philosophie.org.

Bei Rückfragen kontaktieren Sie Lukas Naegeli (lukas.naegeli@uni-passau.de).

The deadline for the special issue „Insights through Metaphors“ has been extended to January 31st, 2026.

We invite contributions that explore questions surrounding the epistemic value of metaphors from the perspectives of philosophy of language, linguistics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and aesthetics.

Journal: Inquiry: An interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Guest Editors:

Jochen Briesen (Heidelberg University)

Jacob Hesse (Ruhr-University Bochum)

Further information can be found here: https://philevents.org/event/show/130678

Call for Papers: Responses to Jody Azzouni’s Target Article

The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic, and Communication (BIYCLC) invites submissions of commentaries, critical notes, or responses to the target article by Jody Azzouni (Tufts University) entitled „Use and mention with respect to ‚know‘, ‚believe‘, ‚evidence‘, ‚justification‘, ‚hypothesis‘, and so on: A hot mess“, recently published in our journal here: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc/vol16/iss1/1/ 

We welcome work from the perspective of any subfield of philosophy (in particular, in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, or metaphysics), or related fields (like psychology, linguistics, or theory of science), that engage with the arguments in this article. This issue follows the tradition of previous target-article issues published in the journal (e.g., Vol. 12 and Vol. 14). Accepted papers will be published alongside invited commentaries. Invited contributors who have agreed to participate include Ram Neta, Otavio Bueno, and Corey Dethier. 

Ideally, submissions should be concise (though there is no strict word limit) and will critically engage with the arguments presented in the target article. All contributions will undergo peer review, so please prepare the manuscript for blind review.

Deadline for submissions: December 31, 2025

Submissions: Manuscripts should be prepared for blind submission and sent as pdf files via email to: The Laboratory for Perceptual Cognitive Systems (University of Latvia) lpcs[AT-symbol]lu.lv and BIYCLC’s assistant editor, Daniel Skibra daniel.skibra[AT-symbol]uni-konstanz.de with the subject line „BIYCLC Volume 16 Submission“. In the message body, please include the essay title, author information (including contact information), and affiliation. 

For inquiries, please contact the editorial office at the emails listed: above: lpcs[AT-symbol]lu.lv and daniel.skibra[AT-symbol]uni-konstanz.de

Seit einem guten Jahr gibt es „LehrGut – Blog für philosophische Hochschullehre“ als Forum für den Austausch über Fragen und Methoden der akademischen Lehre im Fach Philosophie. An die 40 Beiträge sind im Verlauf des ersten Jahres erschienen, geschrieben von Studierenden und Lehrenden aller Karrierestufen. Mindestens alle 14 Tage erscheint ein neuer Beitrag.

Die Redaktion (Anne Burkard, David Lauer, David Löwenstein, Almut von Wedelstaedt) lädt erneut und weiterhin Lehrende und Studierende der Philosophie dazu ein, Beiträge zu allen denkbaren Fragen des guten Lehrens in unserem Fach einzureichen. Auch Kommentare zu bereits erschienenen Beiträgen können eingereicht werden. Ein aktueller thematischer Schwerpunkt beschäftigt sich mit den Herausforderungen, vor die KI die philosophische Lehre stellt. Wir freuen uns auch über Vorschläge für weitere Schwerpunktthemen.

Alle bisherigen Artikel sowie Hinweise für Beitragende finden sich auf der Blog-Homepage: https://lehrgut.org

Guest Editors: Eike Düvel (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) & Jeroen Hopster (Utrecht University)

The upcoming decades have the prospect – and carry the ambition – of multiple societal transformations. The climate crisis necessitates a green transformation from a fossil-fuel-based economy to renewable energy production and transportation, yet political and institutional hurdles to achieving a just transition abound. Recent advances in artificial intelligence suggest the possibility that much work currently done by humans will be thoroughly transformed or replaced.

Societal transformations raise various philosophical questions, yet discourse on societal transformations that is distinctly philosophical is not always visible in the academic literature, and in some respects underdeveloped. The aim of this special issue is to bring together contributions on the topics of societal transformations and transitional justice, to identify core ethical and political principles and frameworks, as well as conceptual distinctions and clarifications, that can advance scholarship in this field.

For instance, large-scale transformations will often create losers and winners – what assistance do we owe to those who, through no fault of their own, find their long-term projects and life plans frustrated? Arguably, some transformations challenge fundamental institutions and basic moral concepts. Do we owe duties to artificial intelligences, and if so, do these duties differ in kind from the ones that we owe to each other? In recent years there has been populist backlash against certain decarbonization policies. Are there any lessons we can learn from this about the desirability, and feasibility, of societal transformations?

Other relevant questions include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• How can functional institutions and long-term governance be procured in transitional processes?
• How can epistemic injustices be avoided in societal transformations? 
• Can insights from social ontology and empirical findings be utilized for a better understanding of societal transformations, including core levers and agents of change?
• Do philosophers require specific methods, e.g., “engaged philosophy”, to reflect on societal transformations?
• What role should risk and uncertainty play in normative theorizing on societal transformations? 

Original research papers between 3.000 and 10.000 words in length should be submitted by January 31st, 2026. All submissions will undergo MOPP’s double-blind refereeing process. Papers will only be accepted for publication in the Special Issue if they are approved for publication by both the journal’s editors and the guest editors. Manuscripts are submitted via ScholarOne at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp.

The guest editors aim to publish the special issue in 2026. Questions can be directed to:

Eike Düvel – eike.duevel@kit.edu

Jeroen Hopster – j.k.g.hopster@uu.nl

Paper submissions are invited for the special issue/collection of Topoi entitled: CAPACITIES-FIRST PHILOSOPHY. This special issue aims to analyze various models of “capacities-first philosophy,” also known as “capacitism,” from the perspectives of epistemology and metaphysics. It focuses on mental capacities, particularly perception and cognitive abilities, as well as causal powers, response-dependent properties, and dispositions.

Guest Editors:

• Luca Oliva, University of Houston, loliva@uh.edu

• C. Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, University of Vienna, naomi.osorio@univie.ac.at

For further information, please see: https://link.springer.com/collections/bjhbbcfice

Submission DEADLINE: Please submit your paper by December 15th, 2025.

Herausgeber*innen: Claudia Blöser, Katharina v. Bronswijk, Samuel J. Kramer, Christoph M. Hausmann

Bei der Auseinandersetzung mit den sozial-ökologischen Krisen und ihren psychischen Folgen taucht früher oder später unweigerlich die Frage nach der Hoffnung auf: Ist sie ein wichtiger Motivator menschlichen Verhaltens oder umgekehrt eine gefährliche, lähmende Einstellung? Dieses Spannungsfeld verläuft zwischen dem Cicero zugeschriebenen “Die Hoffnung stirbt zuletzt.”, Greta Thunbergs “I don’t want you to be hopeful” in der Rede vor dem Weltwirtschaftsforum in Davos und dem kämpferischen Wahlspruch “Hope dies, Action begins” der Gruppe Extinction Rebellion. Der praktische, epistemische oder politische Stellenwert der Hoffnung ist umstritten.

Der Band soll interdisziplinär Beiträge aus der Philosophie und Psychologie/Psychotherapie sammeln. Er verfolgt dabei zwei zusammenhängende Ziele: Erstens soll explorativ erkundet werden, wie die Disziplinen den gemeinsamen Gegenstand verstehen und welche Vorannahmen der interdisziplinären Verständigung und gegenseitigen Bereicherung im Weg stehen könnten. Zweitens sollen zusammengehörige Fragestellungen zur Hoffnung zusammengebracht werden. Zu diesen Fragen gehören u. a. begriffliche („Was ist Hoffnung?”), normative („Was darf ich hoffen?” oder „Was sollen wir hoffen?”), empirische („Wie entsteht Hoffnung?”) und lebenspraktische („Wie kann ich Hoffnung kultivieren?”). Auch wenn die genannten Disziplinen hier traditionell eigene Schwerpunkte setzen, werden diese im Band nicht vorausgesetzt. Stattdessen wird die Zusammenarbeit, gerne auch in Form von interdisziplinärer Co-Autor*innenschaft der Kapitel, angeregt.

Der finale Buchbeitrag soll einen Umfang von maximal 30.000 Zeichen (inkl. Leer- und Sonderzeichen, inkl. Literaturverzeichnis) haben, kürzere Beiträge sind ebenfalls möglich. Für die Bewerbung bitten wir um ein Exposé im Umfang von maximal 1000 Wörtern bis 15.07.25 an s.kramer@uni-koeln.de.

 

Für weitere Informationen und Rückfragen wenden Sie sich ebenfalls gerne an Samuel Kramer: s.kramer@uni-koeln.de

CfP Agency and Free Will in an Indeterministic World: New Perspectives from Philosophy, Biology and Neuroscience

Topical Collection in Synthese. An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science

Guest Editor: Anne Sophie Meincke, University of Vienna

The philosophical debate about free will has long been concerned with whether free will is compatible with the deterministic laws of classical physics. The truth of universal determinism is commonly taken for granted also by those who judge free will to be incompatible with determinism and conclude from this that free will is illusory. Indeed, scepticism about free will is on the rise, fuelled additionally by claims from biology and neuroscience that our genes determine who we are and how we behave, or that we are passive bystanders to the decisions made by our brains. Given this intellectual landscape, it is not surprising that libertarian conceptions of free will have remained a minority position to date. Turning its back on determinism and famously having been accused by Peter F. Strawson of subscribing to an ‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’, libertarianism about free will is still widely dismissed as inconsistent with a scientific worldview.

This topical collection aims to take a fresh look at libertarianism and, more broadly, to explore the prospects for robust notions of agency and free will under indeterminism that do not run counter to science but may even be scientifically grounded. Could there be something like scientific libertarianism? What would it entail? Addressing these questions is timely, given the mounting evidence that our world is indeed indeterministic. As far as physics is concerned, the indeterminacy of quantum behaviour poses a well-known threat to the idea of universal determinism. But also recent developments in biology, such as epigenetics, the noticeable shift from gene-centred to organism-centred theories of evolution and the rediscovery of organisms as agents, challenge biological versions of determinism, especially genetic determinism. At the same time, neuroscientists, such as Björn Brembs, Kevin Mitchell and Peter U. Tse, are disputing the popular narrative that neuroscience has disproved free will, instead providing evidence for indeterministic neural mechanisms that support libertarian free will.

This call for papers invites philosophers (working, e.g., in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and action and the philosophy of biology) as well as philosophically-interested biologists and neuroscientists to present their visions of what it means to be an agent with free will in an indeterministic world. A scientifically grounded account of an ontologically robust, libertarian notion of free will can only be achieved through a collaborative effort across disciplines. Therefore, this topical collection brings together cutting-edge work from all three perspectives in the hope of fostering a productive interdisciplinary dialogue that breaks new ground in the understanding of free will. 

The topical collection is associated with the interdisciplinary conference “Free Will: New Perspectives from Philosophy, Biology and Neuroscience”, taking place at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria, on 11 and 12 June 2025.

The complete text of the CfP, including a list of appropriate topics for submission, is available here.

The deadline for submissions is 15th October 2025.

I am looking forward to your submissions.

The topical collection, co-edited by Katherine Dormandy (Innsbruck) and Erick Winsberg (South Florida, Cambridge), concerns gatekeeping in science.

Science, which we may understand broadly as the natural, social and human sciences, depends on gatekeeping to maintain its epistemic credentials. It must keep out pretenders while remaining porous to outside-the-box insights and to criticisms of its own shibboleths. Overly lenient or overly strict gatekeeping can get science in trouble – we might let in racist biology, or keep out the next Einstein. Yet gatekeeping in science is far from straightforward, with many issues needing philosophical elucidation.

One is that gatekeeping, like science itself, is a human activity and thus vulnerable to groupthink, prestige bias, and careerism, as well as to the influence of ideologies, or problematic background assumptions or conceptual frameworks. Political and financial pressures are also well documented risks. Another issue is the difficulty in solving the demarcation problem, which, though an expression of science’s creativity and flexibility, makes science vulnerable to unprincipled gatekeeping.

A third issue is that it is natural to leave gatekeeping to individual scientific disciplines since they surely know best what they are doing – but it is unclear whether object-level expertise translates to the meta-level competencies needed to gatekeep effectively. And this raises the additional concern that interdisciplinary researchers are vulnerable to weak links among poorly gatekeeping collaborators. Fourth, individual disciplines and research programs in their current form result largely from contingent historical processes; we cannot take for granted that gatekeeping worked smoothly to get them there, raising questions about the scientific status they currently enjoy.

And bad gatekeeping has social upshots, both for science and the broader public. For example, accusations of pseudoscience and disinformation, even when made in good faith by established scientists, can be weaponized to shut down the very debate on which scientific integrity depends. In this way and others, bad gatekeeping can damage public trust in science, perhaps in some cases deservedly. And bad gatekeeping can have wide-reaching practical consequences – not just in areas such as the natural sciences that feed technology or medical development, but also in areas such as the humanities that shape thought and ideology.

A list of sample topics can be found here:

https://link.springer.com/collections/dijeggebce?sv1=affiliate&sv_campaign_id=1858990&awc=26429_1746600467_455b3b672df3cc12b7da2bf9485de29e&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_source=awin&utm_campaign=CONR_BOOKS_ECOM_DE_PBOK_ALWYS_DEEPLINK&utm_content=textlink&utm_term=1858990

For further information, please contact the guest editor(s):

Katherine Dormandy: katherine.dormandy@uibk.ac.at

Eric Winsberg: Ew652@cam.ac.uk

The deadline for submissions is: 31 July 2025