Douglas W. Portmore defends a new moral theory he calls Kantsequentialism. On this view, our most fundamental moral duty is to adopt certain ends—in particular, these four: (a) not manifesting a lack of recognition respect for any person, (b) promoting the impersonal good, (c) being partial concerning certain special relationships, and (d) avoiding the risk of any personal or impersonal disaster. As its name suggests, Kantsequentialism is a hybrid of utilitarianism and Kantianism that combines their different strengths. From utilitarianism, Kantsequentialism takes its act-consequentialism—the idea that whether an agent ought to perform an act just depends on whether they ought to prefer the way it would make the world go to all the ways that the available alternatives would make it go. This allows Kantsequentialism to accommodate our commonsense views about action and reasons for action. From Kantianism, Kantsequentialism takes its commitment both to respecting autonomy and to what W. D. Ross called “the highly personal character of duty” (1930, 22). This allows Kantsequentialism to accommodate our commonsense views about morality, including the idea that, besides the relation of benefactor to beneficiary, there are several other morally relevant relations, including that of agent to patient, lover to beloved, promiser to promisee, etc. These relations are morally relevant despite being relevant only from one’s own actual perspective. In this masterclass, we will take a close look at Portmore’s theory and critically engage with it as a philosophical proposal.
The masterclass is organized by Benjamin Kiesewetter. It is intended for PhD, MA, and advanced BA students. Please note that places may be limited. Registration via: eike.schilling@uni-bielefeld.de.
Douglas Portmore’s manuscript “Kantsequentialism” is available for download at https://sites.google.com/site/dwportmore/kantsequentialism-a-morality-of-ends.